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THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE IN KENTUCKY
Law made on appeal affects two groups of people-those who
look to it as a precedent, a guide to action; and the parties to the
appeal themselves. When settlement of litigation requires more
than one appeal, the effect on the parties themselves takes on a
rigid importance.1
Probably no other procedural rule more acutely reflects the policy
conflict between two of the most important goals in the law, stability
and progress, than does the rule of the "law of the case."2 The rule
itself has been stated in various ways in Kentucky but in its simplest
form it merely requires that questions of law passed on by an appellate
court in remanding a case for further proceedings be considered final
and therefore binding in all subsequent stages of the litigation,
including a second appeal to the same appellate court.3 The doctrine
has two distinct aspects recognized by the Kentucky Court of Appeals;4
the first is the proposition that upon the retrial of the case, a trial court
should obey the mandate of the appellate court, and the second is that
the appellate court itself is bound by its previous decision in any
subsequent review.5
While the doctrine of the "law of the case" is similar to the theories
of res judicata and stare decisis, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has not
effectively tied together their relation. Despite the lack of an adequate
comparison between these doctrines in Kentucky law, at least a brief
consideration of their similarities is necessary for a full understanding
of the "law of the case." The essence of res judicata is that a final
judgment conclusively settles the rights and liabilities of the parties
and thus precludes any further litigation in a subsequent action.6 By
comparison the "law of the case" does not settle any rights, but merely
establishes the law which controls these rights until the judgment is
final.7 Another fundamental distinction lies in the application of these
two doctrines. The "law of the case" theory applies only to successive
I Note, Law of the Case, 5 STAN. L. R v. 751 (1953).2 Note, The Law of the Case, 42 I-Luv. L. REv. 938 (1929).
3 Copley v. Craft, 341 S.W.2d 70 71 (Ky. 1960).
4 The phrase "law of the case" as been used in many distinct senses. See
Lummus, The Law of the Case in Massachusetts, 9 B.U.L. REv. 225 (1929). Its
use in this comment will be confined only to the rulings of an appellate court.
For a discussion of its application to intermediate appellate courts see Comment,
"Law of the Case" in the Intermediate Appellate Courts, 14 TEx. L. RE:v. 511
(1936).
5 See, e.g., W. T. Grant Co. v. Indian Trail Trading Post, Inc., 438 S.W.2d
91 (Ky. 1968); Wenk v. Ruby, 412 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1967); Martin v. Frasure,
352 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1961). These represent the most recent cases stating that
the "law of the case" is binding upon both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
6 See note 1 supra, at 754.
7Id.
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appeals in the same case whereas res judicata applies only when a new
and different law suit is involved.8 The concept of stare decisis is more
readily distinguishable from the "law of the case." In fact the Kentucky
Court has stated that res judicata and the "law of the case" are both
founded on entirely different considerations than stare decisis.9 Basi-
cally stare decisis is merely a principle that requires courts to consider
past decisions as precedents in future actions.' 0 Stare decisis like res
judicata differs from the "law of the case" in that it applies only when
there are two distinct law suits.
Neither res judicata nor stare decisis has been cited in Kentucky
as the basis for the "law of the case" doctrine. The Kentucky Court has
managed to use this theory in case after case without sufficiently
explaining its exact legal basis. The Court has indicated that whether
the rule is regarded as an application of the doctrine of res judicata, or
of stare decisis, or simply a rule of expediency, it is the law recognized
in this state." The Court's reluctance to establish any legal grounds
for the "law of the case" rule can be explained by the fact that in Ken-
tucky it seems to be founded on a policy basis rather than a legal basis.
This policy is simply that at some time there must be an end to
litigation and a final decision upon which the parties can rely.12 Much
of the difficulty in the application of the "law of the case" doctrine
is a result of the direct clash between this policy and the principle
that justice requires a reversal of any erroneous judgment.'5
It would seem that a doctrine such as the "law of the case" would
have originated in the law of Kentucky only after a thoughtful con-
sideration of the consequences involved in its application. It developed,
however, by constant repetition and reliance on some early cases.
These cases did not discuss or explain the reason behind the doctrine
or its origin. The first application of this principle in Kentucky was in
the case Meredith v. Clarke.'4 In Meredith the Court on the second
appeal of the case held that no error could be assigned in a subsequent
appeal that occurred in the first proceedings. While the exact phrase
8 Id.
9 Payne v. City of Covington, 123 S.W.2d 1045, 1051 (Ky. 1938).
10 Stare decisis has been recognized as less forceful and subject to looser ad-
herence than the 'law of the case." See Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 155 S.W.2d
469 (Ky. 1941).
11 Ho . mmonwealth, 70 S.W. 1055 1059 (Ky. 1902).
1
2 See Ball v. Middlesboro Coca-Cola Botdig Works, 99 S.W.2d 205 (Ky.
1936); Sowders v. Coleman, 4 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1928). The notion that the "law
of the case" is a rule of policy and not a rule of law has been recognized in other
jurisdictions. See 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error § 744 (1962).
13 See Note, Successive Appeals and the Law of the Case, 62 HARv. L. BEv.
286, 287 (1948). See also Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 275 (1963).
34 2 Ky. (Sneed) 189 (1802).
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"law of the case" did not appear in the opinion, the decision illustrated
the Court's first use of this legal principle. This principle was applied
in several other Kentucky decisions 15 before the phrase "law of the
case" was initially used in the case Sims v. Reed and Wife.'6 In Sims
the Court stated that its former opinion was binding on both the parties
and the Circuit Court, ". . and must be taken in this court, as well as
in the Circuit Court, to be the law of this case."17 The Court in Sims
did not attempt to define the term or explain its origin. It appeared to
take for granted that the meaning of this phrase was so well-known
that its mere use furnished an adequate reason for the decision. Thus,
without any explanation the phrase "law of the case' was introduced
into Kentucky law.'8
Other state courts have stated that the reason for applying the "law
of the case" rule is that the appellate court lacks the legal power to
change or modify its own judgments except on a rehearing and that
once the mandate has been issued for a retrial the case is taken out
of the jurisdiction of the appellate court.' 9 This theory was also used
in Kentucky in some of the early decisions.20 In Richardson v. Ferguson
the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that it has no "power" to retry
questions following a new trial in a case that was before it on a
former appeal.21 Later decisions indicated that the rule was not
founded on this lack of power but on the policy that litigation should
be ended as speedily as is consistent with an orderly administration of
justice.
22
IG Legrand v. Baker, 22 Ky. 235 (1827); Morgan v. Dickerson's Heirs, 17 Ky.
20 (1824); Rowland v. Craig, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 330 (1804).
26 51 Ky. 51 (1851).
17 Id. at 52.
38 Since its first use in the Meredith and Sims cases the "law of the case"
doctrine has been applied in a multitude of situations arising in Kentucky. A
detailed analysis of the specific examples is beyond the scope of this comment. A
few select examples of its wide application include: whether a particular question
is a question of fact for the jury to decide, Deegan v. Wilson, 157 S.W.2d 68 (Ky.
1941); related to instructions generally, T. E. Vasseur v. Rose, 415 S.W.2d 361 (Ky.
1939); questions of damages, Bender v. Kaelin, 90 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1936); con-
stitutional questions, Madden's Exr v. Commonwealth, 126 S.W.2d 463 (Ky.
1939); validity of contracts, Dorton v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 197 S.W.2d
274 (Ky. 1946); probate matters, Preston's Heirs v. Preston, 130 S.W.2d 797 (Ky.
1939); questions of title to property, Catlin v. Justice, 156 S.W.2d 107 (Ky. 1941);
principal and agent relationship, Gill v. Wall, 239 S.W.2d 235 (Ky. 1951);
negligence and contributory negligence, Carter Coal Co. v. Dozier, 200 S.W. 917(Ky. 1918).
' See, e.g., Hoffman v. Southern Pac. Co., 11 P.2d 387, 388 (Cal. 1932).20 Richardson v. Ferguson, I Ky. L. Rep. 66 (1880); Chandler v. Riggs, 3 Ky.
Op. 77 (1868).
211 Ky. L. Rep. 66 (1880).
22 Ball v. Middlesboro Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 99 S.W.2d 205, 206 (Ky.
1936). See also General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 156 F.2d 615 (C.C.A. Ky.
1946).
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The Kentucky Court has consistently applied a rigid application of
the doctrine of the "law of the case" and in Newman v. Newman the
Court announced that it still followed the "ancient and honored" rule
that the final decision of an appellate court is the "law of the case"
whether right or wrong.2 3 The Newman case represents the most
recent application of the so called "right or wrong" rule recognized in
numerous decisions by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.2 4 Stated in its
simplest form the "right or wrong" rule stands for the proposition that
a former decision by an appellate court in the same case is binding
upon it on a second appeal, irrespective of whether the former decision
was right or wrong. The "law of the case" rule standing alone does not
imply that courts are bound even after discovering a mistake. Thus, in
essence the "right or wrong" rule is an extension of the doctrine of the
"law of the case" in that it makes the doctrine applicable even when
the Court's former decision in the case was erroneous. The first
application of the "right or wrong" rule in Kentucky occurred in the
case Bradford v. Patterson.25 In Bradford the Appellate Court held
that it was bound by its decision even if convinced that it had made
an error in the former appeal. The Court reasoned that this result
was dictated by the possibility that any attempt to correct past errors
may lead to new errors being committed.26 In most of the decisions
applying the "right or wrong" rule, the Court declared its adherence
to the rule but did not specifically find that the former decision was
in fact erroneous. However, in a few cases the Court refused to alter
its former decision even though it specifically found or implied that
the former decision was wrong2 7 No explanation was given in any
of these decisions with regard to the origin of the "right or wrong"
rule, nor was any attempt made to justify its application. Thus, just
as the "law of the case" rule was introduced into Kentucky law through
mere repetition, so was its extension in the form of the "right or
wrong" rule.
An appellate court's refusal to reverse a former decision which
23 451 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Ky. 1970).
24 See, e.g., H. D. Martin v. Frasure, 352 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1962); Taylor v.
Mills, 320 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. 1958); Wallis v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 171 S.W.2d 225
(Ky. 1943); Finley v. Thomas, 134 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1939); Insurance Co. of N.
America v. Creech Drug Store, 94 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1936); Commonwealth v.
Combs 50 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1932); Robinson v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 13
S.W.2d 500 (Ky. 1929); Vanhoose v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 283 S.W. 953
(Ky. 1926); Bates v. City of Monticello, 190 S.W. 1074 (Ky. 1917); Hopkins v.
Adam Roth Grocery Co., 49 S.W. 18 (Ky. 1899); L. & N. R.R. Co. v. Hennen, 11
Ky. L. Rep. 784 (1894); Bradford v. Patterson 8 Ky. (1 A. K. Marsh.) 464 (1819).25 8 Ky. (1 A. K. Marsh.) 464 (1819).
26 Id.
27 See e.g., Cain v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 93 S.W. 622 (Ky. 1906); Brown
v. Marion Nat. Bank, 35 S.W. 926 (Ky. 1896).
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might be erroneous could clearly result in injustice in many instances.
The only policy in favor of such a harsh rule is that which supports the
"law of the case" rule itself, i.e., to put an end to litigation. The basic
rationale is that once a court has handed down an opinion and the
parties have relied upon it as being final, then neither party should be
allowed to question it. This is a valid justification for the "law of the
case rule but it is questionable whether it supports an extension to
the limits of the "right or wrong" rule. Where the appellate court's
first decision is "clearly erroneous" there is no reason to mechanically
follow it under the pretext of finality. Under these circumstances the
notion that justice requires a reversal of any erroneous judgment far
outweighs the policy of putting an end to litigation.
Recognizing the injustice of the "right or wrong" rule, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in the case of Union Light, Heat & Power Company
v. Blackwelrs Administrator, took the first step away from its rigid
application. 28 The Court in Union Light noted the strict adherence to
the rule in Kentucky that an appellate court's decision was the "law
of the case" for a subsequent trial on appeal however erroneous the
decision may have been. Turning away from this strict approach, the
Court recognized that the rule should be subject to certain exceptions.
However, it indicated that the "exception must be rare and the
former decision must appear to be clearly and palpably erroneous."
29
The Court criticized the past decisions which bound a judge to an
erroneous decision, stating that under such circumstances an appellate
court should admit its error rather than sanction an unjust result. The
Court in Union Light proposed the following balancing test stating that
an exception should be recognized:
... where it clearly appears that the result of the error to be cured
far outweighs any harm that may be done in the particular case,
especially where no rights have accrued or become vested and no
substantial change has been made in the status of the parties by
reason of the former decision.30
The Union Light case was thus an indication that Kentucky was fol-
lowing the trend of authorities by recognizing that the administration
of justice requires some flexibility in the 'law of the case" rule.31
The decision in Union Light presumably implied that Kentucky
would no longer follow the strict "right or wrong" rule but would
28 291 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1956).
29 Id. at 542.
30 Id. at 543.
For a list of cases in support of this trend see 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error §§
1824, 1825. The conditions that have led to the departure from the strict applica-
tion of the rule are summarized in Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 275 (1968).
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apply the "clearly erroneous" rule discussed in that case. In several
subsequent decisions this implication was proven to be true.32 In the
most recent of this line of cases, Gossett v. Commonwealth, the Court
recognized the flexibility of the "law of the case" rule in allowing an
appellate court to admit and correct past errors where substantial
injustice might otherwise result.33 In line with the decision in Union
Light, the Court noted that this flexibility was limited to situations
where the former decision is "clearly and palpably erroneous."
34
However, following Gossett, the Court in Newman v. Newman 5
indicated not only that it was reluctant to make any exceptions to the
'law of the case" rule but also that the "right or wrong" rule
remained viable. In Newman the Court recognized that on rare
occasions it has simply announced that it was incorrect in a previous
opinion and proceeded to examine the merits upon a second appeal.
It was made clear that this action should be taken only in the most
urgent situation where the equities in the case compelled the court
to correct an injustice.3 6 The Newman case seemed to re-emphasize
the importance of finality stressed in the earlier decisions and that the
"right or wrong" rule should be followed except in rare cases.
A cursory examination of the most recent case in Kentucky dealing
with the problem of the "law of the case" rule might indicate a renewal
of the trend established in the Union Light and Gossett line of cases to
recognize exceptions to this rule.37 On the first appeal in Lake v. Smith
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge and held that the issues
of agency and scope of employment were jury questions.38 On retrial
of the case, the trial judge followed the mandate of the Appellate
Court and submitted these contested issues to the jury. However, on
the second appeal of this case the Appellate Court reversed the trial
judge again, this time for doing precisely what it had directed him to
do.39 Thus, on the second appeal of the same case the Court simply
reversed its prior decision and held that the trial judge should not have
submitted the case to the jury but should have directed a verdict for
the defendant. A strict application of the 'law of the case" rule would
have bound the Court of Appeals to follow its past decision, but
32 See e g. Gossett v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 117 (Ky. 1969); White
v. Commonweakh, 360 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1962), citing the Union Light case supra
note 28. While these were criminal cases they reflected the changing attitude in
Kentucky law.
33 Gossett v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1969).
34 Id.
35 451 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. 1970).
36 Id.
8 7 Lake v. Smith, 467 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1971).38 Unreported opinion.
39 467 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Ky. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
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instead it reasoned that the rule was not applicable under the facts of
the Lake case. The Court's basis for not applying the rule was simply
that the former opinion becomes the "law of the case" "only where the
facts are substantially identical or the same, upon the trial of each
case."40 This was merely a recognition of the principle well settled in
Kentucky law that where the facts at the second trial are substantially
the same as on the first trial the effect given to the testimony at the first
trial becomes the "law of the case" for any subsequent trial.41 However,
where different questions arise on the second appeal and the second
appeal presents a substantially different set of facts, the former decision
is not controlling.42 Thus, where the evidence presented at the second
trial is materially different than the evidence given at the first trial the
doctrine of the "law of the case" is not applicable. 43 Where the
evidence at the second trial is merely cumulative, however, the Ken-
tucky Court has adhered rigidly to the "law of the case" rule.44
A problem arises during the second trial when the decisive facts in
issue have been established to some extent at the first trial. The
decision as to whether the new evidence is merely cumulative or sub-
stantially different lies within the complete discretion of the appellate
court. This discretion is emphasized by the test announced in Lake
whereby the Court makes a "comparison of the evidence at the
two trials to determine if the substance and probative effect of that at
the second trial was equal or superior to that of the first."45
The decision in Lake places the trial judge in a considerable
dilemma; he must ask the following question concerning the appellate
court's first decision in the case:
40 467 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Ky. 1971) citing language from its former opinion
in Reibert 1v. Thompson, 194 S.W.2d 974, 975 (Ky. 1946).41 This principle has not been fully discussed in any Kentucky case but for
examples of its wide application see Commonwealth Dept. of Highways v. Arnett,
425 S.W.2d 749 (Ky. 1968); Big Sandy Realty Co. v. Stansifer Motor Co., 294
S.W.2d 529 (Ky. 1956); Reibert v. Thompson, 194 S.W.2d 974 (Ky. 1946);
Bryant v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 157 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. 1941); Ins. Co. of N.
America v. Creech Drug Store, 94 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1936); Kentucky Road Oil
Co. v. Sharp, 78 S.W.2d 38 (Ky. 1935); United Talking Mach. Co. v. Metcalfe,
191 S.W. 881 (Ky. 1917).4 2 See Smith v. Feltner, 83 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1935); Cincinnati, N.O. & T.1'.
Ry. Co. v. Perkin's Adm'r, 235 S.W. 776 (Ky. 1921).
43 See Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. McCracken Co., 92 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1936);
Royal Collieries Co. v. Wells, 50 S.W.2d 948 (Ky. 1932); Burley Tobacco Growers'
Co-op. Ass'n v. Brown, 17 S.W.2d 1002 (Ky. 1929); Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry.
Co. v. Alexander, 272 S.W. 886 (Ky. 1925); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Benke's
Adm'r., 195 S.W. 417 (Ky. 1917); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stewart's Adinx., 174
S.W. 744 (Ky. 1915).44 See City of Louisville v. Redmon, 137 S.W.2d 350 (Ky. 1940); Saunders
v. Lincoln Co. Bd. of Educ., 117 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1938); Snyder v. Snyder, 107
S.W.2d 857 (Ky. 1937).
45 467 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1971).
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[Dioes the opinion really mean what it says, or must I guess con-
cerning how some corroborative evidence will strike the fancy of
the appellate court on a second appeal?
46
Where the trial judge considers the evidence to be substantially the
same on the second trial, he is compelled to follow the mandate of the
appellate court. However, doing just this in Lake, the trial judge was
reversed. As previously noted, this places the appellate court in the
inconsistent position of having reversed the trial judge for doing
precisely what it had previously directed him to do. The Kentucky
Court justified this action in Lake on the theory that the evidence at
the second trial was substantially different. The dissenting opinion of
Judge Reed, however, points out that a comparison of the transcripts
of evidence reveals that the only new evidence presented was cor-
roborative testimony of facts already considered in the first appeal.47
Based on this observation, Lake seems to indicate that the "law of
the case" rule may be circumvented merely by introducing corrobora-
tive evidence at the second trial relevant to the same issue fully con-
sidered at the first trial. This is clearly in conflict with the established
treatment of this rule in past Kentucky decisions, which had always
required the evidence to be substantially different before recognizing
an exception to the 'law of the case" rule. This is a strong indication
that the Court of Appeals misapplied the "law of the case" rule in
Lake. If the Court was compelled to reverse the lower court, it should
have done so under the clearly erroneous exception to the "law of the
case" and not under the substantial variance in the evidence rule. Rather
than use this rule as a justification for its results, the Court should have
simply admitted that the first decision was wrong. Thus, instead of
reversing the trial judge for committing an error, the Court should have
relied solely on the clearly erroneous doctrine and held that the 'law
of the case" rule was not applicable because the former decision was
clearly erroneous. This would have been a clear indication that
the Kentucky Court was returning to the Union Light and Gossett line
of cases. However, the Court's reluctance to admit its own mistake
has led to a precedent which could potentially cause a great deal of
confusion as to the proper application of the "law of the case" doctrine.
While Lake did not firmly establish that the Kentucky Court would
apply the doctrine of the "law of the case" with less rigidity, the
decision carried this implication. It is possible to read Lake narrowly
as merely an application of the substantial variance in the evidence
rule which was previously recognized in Kentucky decisions. Read
46 Id. at 121 (dissenting opinion).
47 Id.
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broadly, however, Lake introduces the possibility that the Kentucky
Court of Appeals is de-emphasizing the policy of finality in favor of
justice. Regardless of which of these competing interests is emphasized,
the Court should thoughtfully balance them rather than mechanically
follow the "law of the case" doctrine. When faced with a situation
similar to Lake, it should welcome the opportunity to correct its past
mistakes instead of attempting to camouflage them in its rationale of
the case. Only when this is done will the "law of the case" doctrine
serve any useful purpose in Kentucky law.
Michael McGraw
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-A SURVEY OF COMMUTING
DEDUCTIONS UNDER § 162 OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE AND THE RAMIFICATIONS
OF UNITED STATES V. CORRELL
The scope of this comment is specifically limited to the deductibility
of commuting expenses where a taxpayer drives to work, and returns
to his residence that same day. The cases to be discussed are those in
which the taxpayer has incurred only transportation expenses as
distinguished from situations in which transportation as well as meals
and lodging are involved. The statutory language in the commuting
area is very general,' and subjecting this problem to judicial scrutiny
has resulted in confusion and divergent treatment among taxpayers. 3
SINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162, TIRADE On BusnEss ExPENsEs.
(a) In General.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordi-
nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business, including-
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals
and lodging...) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or
business....
2 Some of the confusion in this area may be because of the generally small
amounts involved in the taxpayer's claim which limit the attorney's research time.
a Compare Gregorio Castillo, 1971-87 Tax Ct. Mem. (April 26, 1971) with
Donald W. Fausner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971). On identical facts Fausner was allowed
a portion of his commuting expenses because he was required to carry his flight
bag and suitcase with him but Castillo's deduction was denied only because he
lived in the Ninth insteaa of the Second Circuit. (controlled by Sullivan v.
Comm'r. 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966)). Compare United States v. Tauferner,
407 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1969), with Edmerson v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 70-1263 (D.C. Wash. 1970). In these cases the courts reached opposite
results with respect to taxpayers who commuted to employment located in a
remote area. Compare Berhow v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 737 (D. Neb. 1968),
with William B. Turner, 56 T.C. No. 3 (April 8, 1971). Here the courts were
divided on the question of whether the taxpayers could deduct commuting when
working temporarily at a distant job site.
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